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The commentators raise a wide variety 
of critical issues, but for obvious reasons of 
space, in this reply I will confine myself to 
what I perceive to be the main themes and 
concerns.
Laurence
Perhaps an obvious place to start is with 
Laurence’s general comment that, “Hypnosis 
(and the alleged depth of it) may be at best 
metaphors for an ensemble of phenomena 
that we either do not grasp yet, that is simply 
too complex to summarize in a few words, 
or that may be explained by seemingly irrec-
oncilable theoretical viewpoints.” (this issue; 
p. 110) If we are looking for some single con-
cept or a few ideas that will relate and ex-
plain all of the phenomena that have at one 
time or another been invoked as indicating 
the presence of ‘hypnosis’, one can only agree 
with Laurence’s view here (see also Wagstaff, 
1981, ix–x).  However, the task of attempting 
to come up with descriptions and explana-
tions of the nature of hypnosis and hypnotic 
phenomena is surely made more difficult if 
we cannot even agree on the core subject 
matter of our investigation.  The existence 
of competing explanatory theories in science 
is a natural and healthy feature of scientific 
enquiry; but to have little consensus on how 
to define the central feature/s of our inquiry 
rather negates the whole enterprise.  
One of the main themes of my paper is 
that, in terms of definition, the term hyp-
nosis and related terminology might fit to-
gether better if they conformed more to their 
etymological origins, and we made the idea 
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of an altered state of consciousness central 
to the definition.  However, Laurence ques-
tions the view that, etymologically, what we 
now term hypnosis has traditionally been 
related to the idea of an ‘altered state of con-
sciousness’.  I would agree that, historically, 
it is certainly the case that the actual term 
‘altered state of consciousness’ was not made 
popular until the 20th Century.  However, I 
am not suggesting that the early magnetists 
and practitioners of hypnosis actually used 
this terminology, but rather that their ideas 
implied the presence of such a concept.  For 
example, although Laurence attempts to dis-
miss Mesmer in this context, it can and has 
been argued that the roots of the sleep-like 
state of ‘magnetic’ or ‘artificial somnambu-
lism’ as described by the early magnetists, 
and many of the other phenomena subse-
quently associated with the term hypnosis, lie 
in the trance-like appearance of, and many of 
the behaviours shown and reportedly expe-
rienced by, subjects during Mesmeric ‘crises’. 
These behaviours included reverie, drowsi-
ness, delirium, catalepsy, automatism, amne-
sia and analgesia (see, for example, Sheehan 
& Perry, 1976; Thornton, 1976; Wagstaff, 1981). 
Indeed, Laurence and Perry (1988) suggest 
that Mesmer may have been “the discoverer 
of artificial somnambulism” (p. 113), and it is 
notable that de Puységur used the word ‘cri-
sis’ in reference to the state he later termed 
‘somnambulistic sleep’ (Figuier, 1860).  The 
idea that Mesmeric ‘crises’ involved a change 
in consciousness is explicitly acknowledged 
by commentators such as Mackay (1869), 
who remarked that, after manifesting a cri-
sis, Mesmer’s subjects were subsequently 
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“restored to consciousness” (p. 279).  Given 
this, Laurence’s comment that Mesmer con-
strued such phenomena as resulting from 
a neurophysiological process is beside the 
point; in fact, most modern proponents of 
the state position on hypnosis assume the 
existence of some kind of distinctive under-
lying neurphysiological process (Oakley and 
Halligan, 2010).
I would also argue that Laurence’s em-
phasis on Abbé de Faria’s penchant for blood 
letting rather misrepresents de Faria’s im-
portant and highly insightful contribution 
to the subject.  Central to de Faria’s (1819) 
ideas was the concept of ‘lucid sleep’, which 
he described as a profound sleep-like condi-
tion, which differed from normal waking, 
and was accompanied by experiences of non-
volition.  Significantly, de Faria argued that 
this condition arose through ‘concentration’, 
or focussing attention on sleep, together with 
the ‘power of conviction’.  In making the link 
between lucid sleep, suggestion and expec-
tancy, de Faria was very much a precursor of 
Bernheim and the Nancy School.  As such, 
de Faria’s speculations about ‘thin blood’ are 
peripheral but, nevertheless, given medical 
knowledge at the time, understandable; he 
thought that thin blood was related to lethar-
gy and a tendency to fall asleep, which might 
lead to greater susceptibility to the state of 
lucid sleep.  
Continuing the theme of an ‘altered 
state’, Bertrand (1826) also argued explic-
itly that the phenomena associated with 
artificial somnambulism were the result of 
an imagination induced state “that differed 
from awakening, sleep and illness” (p. 3). 
Moreover, although D’Hénin de Cuvillers 
(1820) rejected most of the extravagant claims 
made by the magnetists, the reason why he 
chose to apply the prefix ‘hypn’ to a range 
of actors and phenomena was that he con-
sidered the term to be particularly appropri-
ate to situations in which subjects presented 
with the appearance of being in a trance like 
state of somnambulism.  Braid (1843) also ex-
plicitly used the term ‘hypnotic state’ to refer 
to a condition that differed from ‘the waking 
condition’, brought about primarily by eye 
fixation and concentration.  Like many oth-
ers, Braid eventually attempted to distance 
the hypnotic state from sleep; nevertheless, 
the association between hypnotism and the 
‘sleep-like’ state of artificial somnambulism 
continued to be popular throughout most 
of the 19th century and into the beginning of 
the 20th century (see, for example, Bechterew, 
1906; Liébeault, 1866; Lyman, 1885).  Indeed, 
even though Bernheim made a distinction 
between ‘hypnotic sleep’ and the broader 
conception of hypnosis as a ‘peculiar psy-
chical condition’, references to ‘hypnotic 
sleep’ and mention of the accompanying 
change in consciousness, are still very evi-
dent in his writings (see Bernheim, 1889). 
Again, Charcot’s view of hypnosis was that 
it was a trance-like condition that involved 
three stages, catalepsy, lethargy and artificial 
somnambulism, which involved  changes in 
behaviour, perception and experience and 
differed from what he termed “the state of 
waking” (1889, p. 307; see also Ellenberger, 
1970; Sheehan & Perry, 1976).  In sum, not-
withstanding the considerable differences in 
emphasis and explanation, I think it reason-
able to propose that the origins of ‘hypnosis’ 
and related terms lie in the idea that hyp-
nosis involves some kind of altered state or 
condition of consciousness that is associated 
with changes in perception and experience.*  
Moving on to hypnotic depth, Laurence 
argues that conceptions of hypnotic depth 
have varied according to different underly-
ing theoretical approaches.  This is undoubt-
edly the case, and is reflected in the discus-
sion of the meaning of depth reports in my 
paper.  However, I would question his state-
ment that, “At the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury the Nancy school linked the depth of 
hypnosis to the number of items passed not 
the depth of the state” (p 110).  Put this way, 
Bernheim’s ideas seem problematic; the idea 
that hypnosis has various degrees of depth 
independent of the idea of a hypnotic state 
or condition, sounds like a contradiction in 
terms.  However, what Bernheim (1889) actu-
ally says is that it is specifically the presence 
of ‘hypnotic sleep’ (not hypnotic state or 
condition) that does not necessarily corre-
spond to passing suggestions.  As previously 
noted, to Bernheim, the hypnotic condition 
was not the same as hypnotic sleep, rather 
it was more broadly defined as a ‘peculiar 
 
*Terhune alludes to the idea 
that if we want to stick to the 
etymological roots of hyp-
nosis the definition should 
include some reference to 
‘sleep”. One could actu-
ally make such a case. For 
example, metaphors related 
to sleep continue in many of 
induction procedures still in 
use, and, even in the mod-
ern era of hypnosis, some 
have attempted to maintain 
a connection between 
hypnosis and phenomena 
related to sleep (see, for ex-
ample, Barrett, 1979; Evans 
1982).  However, given that, 
in practice, even most sup-
porters of the altered state 
position no longer make any 
such connection, I would 
argue that, on balance, this 
would make the definition 
needlessly out of line with 
most modern scientific 
opinion.
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psychical condition’ related to hypersug-
gestibility; hence suggestions can more rea-
sonably be used to estimate the achieved 
depth of the ‘peculiar psychical condition’. 
Accordingly, Bernheim (1889) describes a 
suggestion based scheme (later referred to 
as the ‘Bernheim Depth Scale’, see Sheehan 
& McConkey, 1982), which he says measures 
the “different degrees of the hypnotic condi-
tion” (p. 10).  To Bernheim, therefore, ‘depth 
of hypnosis’ did not mean ‘degree of respon-
siveness to suggestions’; rather it meant depth 
of the peculiar psychical condition associated 
with changes in responses to suggestion (hy-
persuggestibility).  In doing so, Bernheim 
was one of the early pioneers of the idea of 
using suggestions to measure the hypnotic 
state or condition, which, as I noted in my 
paper, was the rationale behind the original 
suggestion based scales of hypnotizability. 
Indeed, Laurence notes that most typical 
contemporary standardized inductions are 
still worded along the depth dimension.
Laurence also questions the valid-
ity and meaning of depth reports, arguing 
that “Experienced depth may mean very 
little other than the participants espousing 
the metaphors we provide them” (p. 110). 
However, from the hypnosis as a sugges-
tion position, I would submit that this criti-
cism is misplaced.  The idea of hypnosis as a 
metaphor is not a problem for depth reports, 
rather it is fundamental to understanding 
how they operate.  According to the hypno-
sis as a suggestion idea, the main reason why 
participants make self-attributions about 
hypnotic depth is precisely because they are 
responding to the metaphor of hypnosis as 
an altered state.  In other words, hypnotic 
depth reports are for the moment the best 
measure we have of whether participants 
have accepted the suggestion for (or meta-
phor of) hypnosis (which may then have fur-
ther effects on behaviour and experience). 
And for the same reason, depth reports, like 
standard measures of hypnotic suggestibil-
ity, are sensitive to attempts to manipulate 
how participants construe this metaphor 
(Barber, 1969; Silva & Kirsch, 1987; Spanos, 
1986; Spanos & Chaves, 1989; Spanos, Cobb 
& Gorassini, 1985; Wagstaff, Cole & Brunas-
Wagstaff, 2008).
Laurence then goes onto to argue that 
my definitions will not change anything. 
Perhaps not, but I can perceive ways in 
which, if accepted, they might.  For exam-
ple, when investigating ‘hypnosis’, research-
ers might have a clearer and more unified 
idea of how to test and measure relevant 
constructs.  Hence, they would agree that 
an investigation into the effects of sugges-
tion per se (though obviously important) is 
not necessarily an investigation into ‘hyp-
nosis’; they might be able to agree more on 
what does and what does not constitute a 
hypnotic induction procedure; they might 
attempt to test, or take account of, the idea 
that hypnosis is not just what happens when 
someone is given an induction, rather than 
ruling out the possibility ‘by definition’; 
they would agree that ‘hypnotizability’ is 
not the same thing as ‘hypnotic suggest-
ibility’, and that accurate measures of both 
hypnotizability and hypnotic suggestibil-
ity require more than simply measuring re-
sponses to suggestions after an induction, 
and so on.  Of course, as Laurence empha-
sizes, the definitions in themselves will not 
prevent disagreements about whether or not 
the concept of a hypnotic altered state is a 
useful explanatory construct, or whether 
the belief that one is ‘hypnotized’ fits best 
with the available data.  Personally, I share 
his reservations about the altered state con-
struct as an explanatory device and prefer 
the hypnosis as a suggestion (for an altered 
state) approach (Wagstaff, 1998; 2004); but at 
least these issues will remain central to the 
debate, and the continued subject of empiri-
cal scrutiny.  The idea that the way hypnosis 
is defined can potentially have a fundamen-
tal effect on the way research is conducted 
and interpreted is something to which I will 
return in my response to Kirsch.
 Laurence also makes the more general 
criticism that, in practice, definitions of hyp-
nosis are of little value at present because “we 
still do not understand what exactly is hap-
pening during hypnosis” (p. 111).  However, 
again, the question I would pose is, how can 
we possibly understand what is happening in 
hypnosis if we cannot even agree on what it 
is we are trying to understand?  Moreover, 
I disagree with Laurence’s view that saying 
135 || MBR || Volume : 2 || Issue : 2
response The Journal of Mind–Body Regulation
m
br
.j
ou
rn
al
ho
st
in
g.
uc
al
ga
ry
.c
a 
| E
IS
SN
 1
92
5-
16
88
something is ‘alleged’ pre-empts it from be-
ing a fundamental part of a definition.  For 
example, an equivalent definition might be 
one typically applied to a Yeti, such as this 
from the Cambridge English Dictionary: “a 
big creature like a human covered in hair 
that is believed by some people to live in the 
Himalayas” (Yeti, 2013, my emphasis).  
Finally, Laurence argues that my defini-
tions are no advance on “a simple descrip-
tive and operational approach” (p. 110). 
However, as he provides no example of such 
an approach for purposes of comparison, I 
am not able to comment further on this. 
Nevertheless, I do comment shortly on the 
problems related to a simple procedural defi-
nition provided by Terhune, which may be 
relevant to Laurence’s view.  
Woody and Sadler
Much of the first part of Woody and Sadler’s 
commentary (this issue) seems to concern 
apparent similarities and differences be-
tween the views I put forward in the present 
paper and one I wrote 15 years ago (Wagstaff, 
1998).  Whilst I am not entirely clear as to the 
relevance of some of this to discussion of the 
present definition, I will try to address these 
comments, nevertheless.
In my earlier 1998 paper I argued that 
to explain hypnotic phenomena, we do not 
need to postulate the existence of some spe-
cial hypnotic process or altered state in addi-
tion to other ordinary psychological variables 
such as motivation, relaxation, imagination, 
absorption, expectancies, attitudes, beliefs, 
concentration, suggestibility, placebo effects, 
selective attention, role-enactment, compli-
ance with instructions etc.  To do so could be 
construed as a category error; because the phe-
nomena we attribute to hypnosis, including 
reports of feeling hypnotized, and subsequent 
changes in behaviour and experience, are ul-
timately explicable in terms of combinations 
of exactly these same variables.  Woody and 
Sadler seem to think that I have now aban-
doned this position.  However, as far as I am 
concerned I still hold to it; moreover, I see no 
inconsistency between the ideas put forward 
in the present paper and this perspective.  
Woody and Sadler then go on to argue 
that if one believes one is in a hypnotic al-
tered state of consciousness then one actu-
ally is in an altered state, and claim I have 
now adopted this position.  However, whilst 
I can see some potential merits in this con-
ceptualisation for uniting different shades of 
opinion, I have not actually adopted this po-
sition.  I see a number of issues.  For example, 
whilst not rejecting the idea that some hyp-
notic subjects may experience what could be 
construed as shifts in the background state 
of consciousness* because of the nature of 
the inductions given to them (relaxation, 
concentration, absorption, arousal, distrac-
tion  etc.), to say that a person is in an “al-
tered state of consciousness associated with 
etc.”, implying a particular kind or type of 
altered state, simply because he or she de-
cides to label potentially any number of dif-
ferent experiences in this way, seems to me 
to be a rather empty and overextended use of 
the idea of ‘an altered state of consciousness’. 
I am also not clear as to how Woody and 
Sadler perceive the status of this kind of sug-
gested hypnotic altered state vis-à-vis other 
candidates for the title of hypnotic state. 
For example, can one be in an altered state 
of hypnosis without believing that one is in 
one? And if so, is this latter state the same 
or different from the altered state that arises 
when one believes one is hypnotized?  But, 
in any case, none of this is really pertinent 
to the point I was trying to make in the 1998 
paper, which was simply that, for the idea of 
hypnosis as a suggestion for an altered state 
to be useful in a definition of hypnosis, or 
as a way of categorising someone as ‘hyp-
notized’, it is actually unnecessary to make 
any assumptions about whether, in reality, 
the participant is in an altered state of con-
sciousness.  I see no reason to change my po-
sition on this.
Woody and Sadler further suggest that 
the definition of hypnosis I propose is an 
“awkward combination of different things” 
(p. 113), and give an example of how the syntax 
involved can look rather strange: i.e. “Obesity 
can be defined as 1) an alleged altered state of 
weight . . . or 2) acceptance of the suggestion 
that one is in such a condition” (p 113).  Given 
 
* I am grateful to Professor 
Irving Kirsch for drawing 
my attention to the possible 
relevance of the concept of 
background state of con-
sciousness to this issue.
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the fairly common consensus that obesity is 
a medical condition involving excess body 
fat (not an ‘altered state of weight’ associ-
ated with suggestion), and is something that 
can be objectively measured in various ways, 
this definition does, of course, look silly. 
However, the following definition of a more 
contentious phenomenon might appear less 
so: “Spirit possession is the alleged control of 
someone by a spirit or other disincarnate en-
tity, or the belief that one is being controlled 
in this way”.  Moreover, I would argue that 
it is not uncommon in definitions of scien-
tifically contentious phenomena to use terms 
that combine what is with what is alleged or 
believed, as in my previous example of the 
term ‘Yeti’.  
Woody and Sadler also state that the def-
inition I provide is too simplistic.  Thus they 
say, “Over the years we have repeatedly point-
ed to a wide array of evidence that hypnosis 
is a complex amalgam of social experiences 
and cultural expectations, individual differ-
ences in multiple underlying abilities, and 
important contextual factors .  .  . It cannot 
be reduced to one thing (i.e., the belief that 
one is in an altered state)” (p. 113).  However, 
I would argue that this is not relevant to the 
definition of hypnosis per se, rather it is a 
statement about the factors that influence 
and contribute to ‘hypnosis’ as defined, and 
the phenomena associated with it.  We would 
not argue that a definition of a child as say, 
“a human between the stages of birth and 
puberty”, is too simplistic because children’s 
bodies are made up of millions of parts and 
their behaviours are influenced by a com-
plex amalgam of factors.  In fact, there is no 
contradiction between the simple definition 
of hypnosis as acceptance of the suggestion 
that one in an altered state (as per my defini-
tion), and the view that the way this attribu-
tion is made, and its manifestations in terms 
of effects on behaviour and experience, are 
determined and influenced by a multitude of 
factors.  Indeed, the multifaceted nature of 
hypnotic behaviour and experience is one of 
the hallmarks of the sociocognitive or cogni-
tive behavioural position to which the hyp-
nosis as a suggestion or belief proposition is 
closely allied (Wagstaff, 1998; 2004).  
Finally, Woody and Sadler take excep-
tion to the use of the term ‘imaginative expe-
riences’ which I left in my amended version 
of the 2003 APA definition; i.e. “A hypnosis 
procedure will typically involve an intro-
duction to the procedure during which the 
subject is told that suggestions for imagina-
tive experiences will be presented” (Green, 
Barabasz, Barrett, & Montgomery, 2005, p. 
262).  Their main objection is that hypnoti-
cally suggested phenomena have a veridical 
or realistic quality that distinguishes them 
from imagined events.  I agree with Woody 
and Sadler that, in their preambles, most of 
the standard hypnotizability scales do not 
explicitly refer to anything ‘imaginative’; 
Cardeña makes the same point and I will ad-
dress this in my response to him.  However, 
it could be argued that Woody and Sadler’s 
main objection here is based on a false dis-
tinction.  Even if hypnotic suggestions are 
experienced differently (more veridically) 
than simple instructions to ‘use the imagi-
nation’, this does not mean that profound 
responses to hypnotic suggestions are not 
‘imaginative experiences’.  For example, like 
any hallucinatory experience, even if they 
show equivalent neurophysiological effects, 
so-called ‘real as real’ hypnotic hallucina-
tions are not ‘real’ in the sense of corre-
sponding to or reflecting the influence of an 
external stimulus; i.e. they are still ‘products 
of the imagination’.  Similarly, the Creative 
Imagination Scale, with or without hypnotic 
induction, explicitly employs ‘imaginative 
suggestions’; but this is not meant to im-
ply that suggestions cannot be experienced 
with a veridical quality.  Indeed Kirsch and 
Braffman (1999) describe imaginative sug-
gestions as “requests to experience an imagi-
nary state of affairs as real” (p. 226).  Hence, 
I would argue that the issue addressed in the 
studies cited by Woody and Sadler in this 
respect concerns a distinction between the 
intensity and quality of imaginative experi-
ences following hypnotic suggestions versus 
non-hypnotic or simple ‘imagination’ in-
structions, not a distinction between non-
hypnotic imaginative versus hypnotic non-
imaginative experiences.  
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Terhune
Terhune, like Kirsch, again questions my 
stance on relating definitions to etymology, 
so I will return to this later in my response 
to Kirsch.
However, Terhune also presents a num-
ber of arguments against the idea of hyp-
nosis as acceptance of a suggestion for an 
altered state and the use of depth reports as 
a measure of hypnotizability.  For example, 
he argues that, “Hypnotic inductions do not 
produce uniform changes in spontaneous 
experience across, nor within, levels of hyp-
notic suggestibility . . . and thus spontaneous 
experiences following an induction do not 
provide a reliable method of determining 
whether something qualifies as hypnosis nor 
how responsive someone is” (p. 116).  I would 
make two main points here.  First, according 
to the hypnosis as a suggestion position, it is 
not the spontaneous experiences per se that 
people have following induction that deter-
mine whether they accept the suggestion for 
hypnosis; rather it is the willingness to in-
terpret or label the context and their experi-
ences as ‘hypnosis’ that determines whether 
participants decide they have been hypno-
tized (and thus how they rate their level of 
depth).   Indeed, in my paper I make specific 
reference to this issue by suggesting that the 
reason why depth reports correlate so well 
with suggestion measures of hypnotizabil-
ity, is not because they accurately reflect the 
experiences of an altered state or states, but 
rather they reflect acceptance of the sugges-
tion for hypnosis.  But, most important, it 
is well established that simple self ratings of 
‘feeling hypnotized’ (hypnotic depth reports) 
are actually psychometrically as reliable as 
suggestion based measures; moreover, the 
direction of the difference between the depth 
reports of participants classified according to 
levels of hypnotic suggestibility is highly reli-
ably maintained throughout a series of sug-
gestions of varying difficulty and on separate 
occasions; i.e. depth scores show parallel non-
overlapping within and between suggestibility 
tests.  Depth scores also correlate as well with 
suggestion based scales as the suggestion 
based scales do with each other (Tart, 1970; 
Wagstaff et al., 2008).  
Terhune further suggests that the is-
sue of whether someone is or is not hyp-
notized  “does not provide valuable infor-
mation above and beyond standardized 
behavioural and experiential measures of 
hypnotic suggestibility” (p. 116), and com-
ments that, “Considered within the context 
of a procedural definition, the (aforemen-
tioned) example of the participant who is 
slightly responsive to hypnotic suggestions 
but does not believe they s/he was hypno-
tized indicates that the participant took part 
in a hypnosis protocol and displayed a cer-
tain level of hypnotic suggestibility.  There 
are no complications regarding whether or 
not the person was hypnotized” (p. 116).  As 
I point out in my paper, purely procedural 
conceptualisations of hypnosis such as this 
are highly problematic.  For example, if we 
have no definition of hypnosis beyond a 
procedure, then what exactly is a ‘hypnosis 
protocol’ as distinct from a protocol that is 
not one? And what sense can we make of the 
idea that the person was displaying ‘a certain 
level of hypnotic suggestibility’ when we do 
not know whether he or she was even af-
fected by the hypnosis protocol? This is like 
saying that that ‘alcoholic behaviour’ is be-
haviour that follows the offer of an alcoholic 
drink, even if the drink is refused.  
Next Terhune outlines a number of fur-
ther objections to the use of the depth re-
ports.  He says, “contra Wagstaff’s claim to 
the contrary, hypnotic depth measures are 
actually far inferior to measures of hypnotic 
suggestibility.  The instructions for depth re-
ports are overly broad and thus it is not clear 
what participants are basing their depth re-
ports on.  Added to this, hypnotic depth is 
a gross over-simplification of the panoply of 
spontaneous experiences that follow a hyp-
notic induction, particularly those in highly 
suggestible individuals.  Relying on a single 
numerical value of an individual’s sponta-
neous experiential response to an induction 
is untenable because participants will likely 
differentially weight particular experien-
tial dimensions when computing this value 
and thus hypnotic depth values cannot be 
meaningfully compared across individuals” 
(p. 116; his emphasis).   
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Notably this statement makes no refer-
ence to the object of the measurement; i.e.  far 
inferior for measuring what? As I mentioned 
in my paper, as measures of hypnotizability, 
standard suggestion based measures notori-
ously confound hypnotic and non-hypnotic 
suggestibility (see, for example, Braffman 
& Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch & Braffman, 1999; 
Weitzenhoffer, 1980).  This issue does not 
arise with depth scales (Wagstaff et al., 
2008).  Hence, according to the arguments 
in my paper, hypnotic depth reports are, as 
yet, probably the best measure we have of 
hypnotizability or hypnotic susceptibility, 
i.e. the ability to enter hypnosis defined as an 
alleged altered state etc., or ability to respond 
to or accept a suggestion that one is in such a 
condition (see also Bowers, 1983; Wagstaff et 
al., 2008).  However, hypnotic suggestibility, 
which in my definition is the ability or ten-
dency of a person to respond to suggestions 
when ‘hypnotized’ (i.e. in the alleged state, 
or having accepted the suggestion for one), 
is possibly measured most accurately by a 
combination of depth reports and responses 
to suggestions.  
Nevertheless, notwithstanding all this, I 
would argue that Terhune’s comments here 
miss the point.  As I mentioned earlier, al-
though interesting as a research question, 
from the perspective of the hypnosis as a 
suggestion position, for measuring hyp-
notizability, what ultimately matters is not 
what kinds of experiences participants base 
their reports on, or exactly how they weight 
their experiences, but rather the outcome of 
the attribution process; that is, do they be-
lieve themselves to be ‘hypnotized’ and to 
what degree?  As Sheehan and McConkey 
(1982) have well documented, the experi-
ences and processes that underlie responses 
to hypnotic suggestions in general are also 
idiosyncratic, diverse and complex, but this 
has not prevented researchers from using the 
outcomes of these experiences and processes, 
i.e. simple behavioural and subjective rating 
criteria, to measure hypnotic suggestibility. 
Also, the fact that Long Stanford Scale style 
depth reports rely on a single numerical esti-
mate does not, as a matter of principle, make 
them unreliable or invalid.  These are em-
pirical matters.  As noted previously, simple 
hypnotic depth reports are demonstrably as 
reliable and valid in terms of criterion based 
validity as the standard suggestion based 
measures; moreover, there is no evidence 
that more complex experiential measures 
of hypnosis, such as the Phenomenology of 
Consciousness Inventory (PCI) perform any 
better (Wagstaff et al., 2008).
To illustrate the predictive power of depth 
reports in measuring hypnotizability, it may 
be also useful to look at the issue from an-
other perspective.  It is generally agreed that 
whatever hypnosis is, it is enhanced or fa-
cilitated by hypnotic induction procedures 
(otherwise there would be no point in using 
them).  Consequently, if a measure is a good 
measure of ‘hypnotizability’, in the sense of 
capturing participants’ responses to whatever 
it is that is induced or influenced by a hyp-
notic induction procedure, then from scores 
on this measure it should be possible to pre-
dict statistically who, and who has not, been 
given a hypnotic induction procedure on a 
particular occasion.  Using this criterion, 
depth scores will almost always outperform 
suggestion-based measures for a very obvious 
reason; unlike scores on most standard sug-
gestions, in conditions where there is no in-
duction, or anything that could be construed 
as an induction, or used to label the context 
as ‘hypnotic’, then LSS scores tend towards 
zero (Wagstaff et al., 2008).* However, though 
strikingly obvious and predictable, this is not 
a trivial point.  As noted in my paper and 
elsewhere, this finding actually offers strong 
support for the construct validity of depth 
reports as a measure of hypnotizability; i.e. 
depth reports tend towards zero in a situation 
in which, according to the main perspectives 
on hypnosis, one would not expect hypnosis 
to be present (at least to any appreciable de-
gree).  In contrast, the fact that scores on the 
standard suggestibility tests continue to be 
substantial, and to differentiate between indi-
viduals in the absence of a context that could 
be construed as ‘hypnotic’, severely compro-
mises their construct validity as measures of 
hypnotizability (which is why I suggest they 
are better considered as a proxy measure).  In 
sum, given that, empirically, depth reports are 
at least as reliable as suggestion based mea-
sures of hypnotizability, and appear to be su-
perior in terms of construct validity, I can see 
no empirical basis for Terhune’s conclusion 
 
* As an example of predic-
tive value of depth reports, 
consider the following 
data that were collected by 
Chantal Worden and the au-
thor. Forty participants were 
assigned to two conditions, 
one with and one without 
hypnotic induction. Those 
in the hypnotic induction 
group were given a standard 
relaxed induction technique 
adapted from Barber (1969). 
Following this, they were 
asked to rate their level hyp-
notic depth on the LSS (Tart, 
1970). They were then given 
the SSHS:A suggestions for 
hand lowering, finger lock, 
arm rigidity and hands mov-
ing, and were required to 
rate their responses to each 
suggestion on a five point 
Likert scale according to the 
degree they experienced the 
suggested effects (“not at 
all” to “very much”, giving 
a minimum score of zero 
and a maximum of 16). As 
predicted, results showed 
that both depth and experi-
ential suggestion scores were 
significantly higher in the 
induction condition (medi-
ans, 2 and 8, respectively), 
than in the non-induction 
condition (medians, 0 and 
6, respectively), Mann-
Whitney z = 5.47, p < .0001, 
and  z = 3.022, p < .004, 
respectively. However, the 
large effect size for depth 
(r = .87), was consider-
ably greater than the more 
moderate effect size for sug-
gestion (r = .48). Moreover, 
when depth and suggestion 
were entered into a binary 
logistic regression, only 
depth significantly predicted 
whether participants had 
been assigned to the induc-
tion and non-induction 
conditions, χ2(1) = 4.04, 
p = .044, and  χ2(1) = 0.99, 
p = .321, respectively. (The 
correlations between depth 
and suggestions passed 
were, rs = .74, p < .001, and 
.18, p < .45,  within the in-
duction and non-induction 
groups, respectively.)
 
† Terhune is critical of my 
statement that depth reports 
can outperform hypnotic 
suggestions in predicting 
hypnotic amnesia, in that 
the data I report con-
cern only one measure of 
(...suite next page)
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that, “hypnotic depth measures are actually 
far inferior to measures of hypnotic suggest-
ibility” (p. 116).†
Terhune finishes by proffering his own 
procedural definition of hypnosis; i.e. “hyp-
nosis consists of a set of procedures includ-
ing a hypnotic induction, intended to modify 
suggestibility, followed by the administra-
tion of one or more suggestions, intended to 
measure hypnotic suggestibility, modulate 
a particular psychological phenomenon, or 
treat a specific symptom” (p. 116; his em-
phasis).  The problems commonly associated 
with this kind of procedural definition have 
already been covered in my paper.  Again, 
these include, what is the definition of a hyp-
notic induction procedure? Is it any proce-
dure that intends to modify suggestibility? If 
so, presumably we should call any procedure 
that is intended to motivate participants to 
respond more to suggestions (such as offer-
ing a reward) ‘hypnotic’.  Moreover, what 
is ‘hypnotic suggestibility’ as distinct from 
‘non-hypnotic suggestibility’ or just ‘sug-
gestibility’?  This distinction is implied but 
not given in the definition.  If hypnotic sug-
gestibility is simply ‘suggestibility with or 
after a hypnotic induction procedure’, and 
an induction procedure is ‘any procedure 
intended to modify suggestibility’, some of 
the implications might seem rather coun-
terintuitive.   For example, in the absence of 
any attempt to modify his or her behaviour, 
a person who says he or she feels ‘very deeply 
hypnotized’, and responds both behavioural-
ly and experientially in an unusually com-
pelling way to a range of suggestions, can-
not be exhibiting ‘hypnotic suggestibility’; 
indeed, by definition, his or her behaviour 
cannot have anything to do with ‘hypnosis’. 
In contrast, someone who has been given a 
procedure that involves offering him or her 
a few dollars to motivate him or her to re-
spond to suggestions, and who subsequently 
responds superficially to one simple sug-
gestion (to which he might have responded 
anyway), yet denies feeling even the slightest 
bit hypnotized, is, by definition, engaged in 
‘hypnosis’, and is displaying ‘hypnotic sug-
gestibility’.  Whilst the interpretation of such 
scenarios might be logically coherent within 
a procedural definition, I am not sure they 
would make much sense to most hypnosis 
practitioners, let alone to participants.   
  Within the definition I have put for-
ward, a hypnotic induction procedure is spe-
cifically a set of instructions and suggestions 
designed to facilitate entry into the alleged 
hypnotic state, or convey the suggestion that 
one is entering such a condition.  From this 
viewpoint, therefore, whilst the purpose of 
a hypnotic induction procedure may be the 
same has that specified by Tehune, i.e. it is 
‘intended to modify suggestibility’, this is 
not the same as its definition.  The way I see 
it, without this kind of consideration of what 
is actually meant by a ‘hypnotic induction’ 
procedure, as distinct from any other kind of 
motivating or orienting procedure, attempts 
to define hypnosis operationally in terms of 
a procedure or set of procedures will inevita-
bly run into problems.  Moreover, to mean-
ingfully define what uniquely characterises 
‘hypnotic’ induction procedure, it is difficult 
to avoid invoking a further overarching def-
inition of ‘hypnosis’ that is non-procedural 
(such as, hypnosis is an alleged altered state 
or acceptance of the suggestion for one etc.). 
Polito, Barnier and 
McConkey
Polito et al. (this issue) provide a rather more 
supportive commentary of my paper, though 
they argue that it is better if a definition can 
be formulated that fits with, or is driven by 
available empirical data rather than derived 
from etymological or ideological reason-
ing.  I would agree that, ideally, this sounds 
the best approach.  However, as I attempt to 
demonstrate in my paper, in practice, this is 
often very difficult to do when the terms al-
ready exist.  Moreover, as I point out in my 
response to Laurence, it is also very difficult 
to conduct meaningful empirical investiga-
tions when we cannot even agree on the es-
sential subject matter of our investigation. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that my defini-
tion is still very much influenced by the re-
sults of empirical research.  Hence the use of 
the concept of an ‘altered state etc.’, without 
any reference to sleep, reflects the modern 
views of those who believe the empirical 
research supports this idea.  Moreover, the 
term ‘alleged’ and the idea of ‘acceptance of 
amnesia; for other measures 
depth and suggestions 
predicted amnesia more or 
less equivalently. Terhune is 
correct in this observation; I 
should have made this clear-
er (see Wagstaff et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, these data still 
clearly contradict Terhune’s 
general view that, “hypnotic 
depth measures are actually 
far inferior to measures of 
hypnotic suggestibility”.
(...suite)
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the suggestion that one is in an altered state’, 
have been added to reflect the views of those 
(including myself) who, also influenced by 
empirical research, are more sceptical about 
the utility of postulating a hypnotic altered 
state, or place less emphasis on the idea.
However, the main point that Polito et 
al., make is that, although hypnotic induc-
tions may increase the probability that par-
ticipants will respond to suggestions both 
behaviourally and experiencially, they are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for this to 
happen.  Polito et al. provide a number of 
interesting examples to illustrate their point. 
As they emphasize, their examples add to a 
large literature showing that a range of fac-
tors may contribute to alterations in behav-
iour, perception and experiences in response 
to suggestions, beyond the administration of 
hypnotic induction procedures.  On the ba-
sis of this, they then comment, “most partici-
pants in these studies experienced hypnosis-
as-product because they had the ability to do 
so, and the relevance of an induction proce-
dure was dependent on the specific context” 
(p. 120).  In other words, some people can ex-
perience ‘hypnosis as a product’ without an 
induction.  This fits with my analysis and ap-
pears to be a rejection of Terhune’s position. 
However, it can still be argued that, unless we 
have some other way of determining wheth-
er someone has been ‘hypnotized’ indepen-
dently of their responses to suggestions, how 
can we possibly know that someone is expe-
riencing ‘hypnosis as a product’ when they 
have not received an induction? The fact that 
someone may respond profoundly to sugges-
tions without an induction does not neces-
sarily mean they are hypnotized or showing 
‘hypnotizability’; they could just be exhibit-
ing ‘non-hypnotic suggestibility’.  Of course 
we could argue that anyone who responds 
profoundly to suggestions is ‘hypnotized’, or 
showing ‘hypnotic ability’, but again, with-
out some independent measure of the pres-
ence of ‘hypnosis’, this is circular and begs 
the question.
In the absence of any definitive indica-
tors of a ‘hypnotic state’ that can be used 
with participants who have not been given 
induction procedures I would suggest that, 
for the moment, depth reports may provide 
the best indicator of whether ‘hypnosis’ is 
present in participants who have not re-
ceived an induction (for an example of the 
use of depth reports in this way, see Hilgard 
and Tart, 1966). 
Cardeña
Like Woody, Cardeña (this issue) correctly 
points out that, regardless of the role that 
imagination may play in response to the 
kinds of suggestions typically used in con-
texts defined as ‘hypnotic’, many inductions 
do not explicitly refer to the concept of ‘imag-
ination’.  However, there is some ambiguity 
surrounding the use of the term ‘imagina-
tive suggestions’ in the 2003 APA definition, 
as some authorities use the term ‘imagina-
tive suggestion’ to denote more generally the 
kinds of suggestions associated with the do-
main of hypnosis (see, for example, Kirsch 
& Braffman, 1999; Milling, Kirsch, Allen & 
Reutenauer, 2005, and Kirsch’s commentary 
here).  This may require further clarification 
in any amended APA definition.  
Cardeña also emphasizes the important 
point that, although the label of hypnosis 
(whether explicit or implicit) may be neces-
sary for inductions to facilitate responses to 
subsequent suggestions, and that a variety 
of inductions may produce similar effects, 
this does not mean that all inductions will 
have the same effects.  I agree.  According 
to the hypnosis as a suggestion perspective, 
for an induction to successfully facilitate 
responses to suggestion through ‘hypnosis’, 
the procedures and experiences engendered 
by those procedures must be consistent with 
the participant’s expectations and assump-
tions concerning what it means to be ‘hyp-
notized’.  Not surprisingly, therefore, as I 
point out in my paper, the effectiveness of 
inductions can be substantively, and some-
times dramatically, affected by contextual 
and attitudinal variables (see, for example, 
Barber, 1969; Silva & Kirsch, 1987; Spanos, 
1986).  But also, from the same perspective, 
individuals are more likely to make the at-
tribution that they have been ‘hypnotized’ if 
they have some evidence, such as changes in 
bodily experiences and experiential shifts in 
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the background state of consciousness, that 
they can use to reinforce this attribution 
(see Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; Hilgard, 
1986).  Hence inductions that do not facilitate 
such shifts may be relatively less effective in 
promoting the attribution that hypnosis has 
occurred.  Cardeña’s reminder that both re-
laxation and alerting inductions tend to be 
significantly more effective in enhancing 
than a label of hypnosis alone, seems perti-
nent here.  Moreover, the findings reported 
by Cardeña that a long induction may be 
more effective than a very short one also 
could be construed as supporting this view, 
in that a lengthy induction might be more 
likely to a) fit in better with participant’s ex-
pectations about what a ‘hypnotic induction’ 
should involve, and b) give greater oppor-
tunity to generate experiential changes that 
can be used to reinforce the attribution that 
‘hypnosis’ is occurring.  
Cardeña also makes some interesting 
observations about how shifts in experience 
generated by induction procedures may used 
by participants to reinforce their attribu-
tions that hypnosis is occurring and facili-
tate responses to suggestions; for example, 
inductions may encourage the redirection 
of attention away from extraneous concerns, 
result in a shift to a more experiential mental 
set, and facilitate experiences that for many 
are atypical in everyday life, such as those 
accompanying prolonged attention.  As I 
point out in my paper, the idea that the ex-
perience of suggestion effects, particularly, 
involuntariness, can be facilitated through 
the redirection of attention, has been popu-
lar amongst theorists of a variety of persua-
sions (Crawford & Gruzelier; 1992; Egner & 
Raz, 2007; Spanos, 1982; Wagstaff, 2004).  As 
Cardeña notes, these considerations also po-
tentially allow comparisons to be made be-
tween the characteristics and effects of some 
induction procedures and other contexts, 
such as in certain rituals and cases of trau-
ma (as well as meditation, autogenic train-
ing etc.).  The question remains, however, 
as to whether any of these factors has any 
substantive effect on standard suggestibility 
measures divorced from the contextual label 
of ‘hypnosis’, or attributions by participants 
that hypnosis has occurred.   
Notwithstanding these considerations, 
therefore, I would still argue that manipu-
lating subjects’ expectancies and beliefs as to 
whether hypnosis is present, and what hyp-
nosis is likely to do, has considerably more 
effect on responses to suggestions following 
induction, than changing the mechanics of 
the induction procedure (Banyai & Hilgard, 
1976; Barber, 1969; Glass & Barber, 1961; 
Gibbons & Lynn, 2010; Silva & Kirsch, 1987; 
Spanos, 1986; Spanos, Cobb & Gorassini, 
1985).  
Kirsch
Kirsch’s observation that preferences for 
different types of definition do not seem 
correlated with theoretical stances on the 
altered state issue (this issue) is an impor-
tant one.  As a long time proponent of the 
sociocognitive perspective on hypnosis, I too 
have vacillated between various definitions. 
However, contrary to Kirsch’s interpreta-
tion of my position, I do not actually argue 
that a broad definition of hypnosis necessar-
ily leads to contorted terminology, such as 
‘hypnotic hypnosis’ and ‘hypnotic non-hyp-
nosis’.  Rather, the point I attempt to make is 
that such problems tend to occur when one 
tries to incorporate more traditional con-
cepts and related terminology within a defi-
nition of hypnosis which equates hypnosis 
with responding to suggestion.  As far as I 
can see, this is more or less the same point 
that Kirsch makes with regard to mixing up 
narrow and broad definitions.  It is interest-
ing to speculate, therefore, how we might go 
about defining our terms more consistently 
within a broader definition.
For example, suppose, to use Kirsch’s 
words, we define hypnosis broadly as “re-
sponding to imaginative suggestions [with 
or] without the induction of hypnosis, re-
gardless of the presence or absence of a hyp-
notic state” (noting, of course, that Kirsch is 
not actually offering an endorsement of this 
position; p. 124).  Within this definition as 
stated, we would still need to define what 
is meant by ‘the induction of hypnosis’ and 
‘hypnotic state’; that is, we need to untangle 
the form, “Y is X with or without the induc-
tion of Y or a state of Y”.  This might have 
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some significant implications.  For example, 
if by ‘the induction of hypnosis’ we mean the 
presence or use of an hypnotic induction pro-
cedure, then if hypnosis is simply respond-
ing to imaginative suggestions (‘hypnotic’ 
does not refer to an altered state/ acceptance 
of a suggestion for one), then a hypnotic in-
duction procedure would presumably mean 
something like, ‘any procedure designed to 
increase responses to suggestions’ (includ-
ing offering a reward etc.).  In fact, it might 
make more sense to abandon the term ‘in-
duction’ altogether in favour of something 
less archaic, such as ‘facilitation’ (hypnosis 
facilitation procedure etc.).  If we wanted, we 
could still allow the concept of a ‘hypnotic 
state’ to coexist with this broader definition 
(meaning something like, ‘a state associated 
with changes in response to imaginative 
suggestions’); thus we could logically have 
‘(hypnotic) state hypnosis’, and ‘non-state 
hypnosis’.  However, the concept of ‘non-
hypnotic (imaginative) suggestibility’ would 
have to go.  Hence the comment on the 
HUUK (2012) website that, “People respond 
better to suggestions while in hypnosis” 
would become conceptually meaningless.  In 
the same way, ‘hypnotic suggestibility’ as it 
is normally understood (i.e. as response to 
standardized scale type suggestions in the 
presence of hypnosis and/or after hypnotic 
induction) would have to disappear or be re-
placed by something like ‘facilitated hypno-
sis’ (otherwise it would become a tautology, 
equivalent to ‘hypnotic hypnosis’).* Other 
implications might include the alternative 
labelling of studies of primary suggestibility, 
such as those of Eysenck and Stukat, as stud-
ies of ‘hypnosis or hypnotism’.  Also, many 
practitioners of CBT and other psychological 
therapies using suggestive techniques might 
find themselves re-categorised as ‘hypno-
therapists’.  In fact, depending on whether 
they use hypnotic induction/facilitation 
procedures, they could be categorised as 
practising ‘facilitated’ and ‘non-facilitated’ 
hypnotherapy.  But perhaps most important, 
the results of years of research and numer-
ous studies purporting to assess the effects of 
hypnosis by comparing responses to sugges-
tions with and without hypnotic induction 
would have to be reinterpreted (or written 
off?) as demonstrating the effects of induc-
tion  procedures (or suggestion facilitation 
instructions) on hypnosis, not the effects of 
hypnosis on suggestion.  So, for example, by 
definition, using the hypnotic induction ver-
sus no induction paradigm, Woody would 
not be able to test the hypothesis that sug-
gestions are experienced more veridically 
with hypnosis, only whether hypnotic ex-
periences are more veridical after attempts 
have been made to facilitate them.
 How well such a definition might be re-
ceived amongst academics and other hypno-
sis professionals is difficult to say.  I would 
imagine that the abandonment of the idea 
that one can respond to (imaginative) sug-
gestions “in and out of, or with and without, 
hypnosis”, could be a major sticking point. 
My personal view is that it makes a lot more 
sense to construe hypnosis, as did Bernheim, 
as belonging within the broad domain of 
suggestion, rather than taking the view that 
suggestion (or at least imaginative sugges-
tion) is within the broad domain of hypno-
sis (which to me, is a bit like categorising a 
motor vehicle as a type of bus).  However, it 
might be interesting to conduct a survey of 
hypnosis researchers and practitioners, pit-
ting a detailed version of this broad defini-
tion against my more narrow definition.  
Like Terhune, Kirsch also questions my 
arguments regarding adherence to the use 
of the etymological origins of terms.  Kirsch 
draws attention to the fact that some scien-
tific definitions can and have changed over 
time.  This is, of course, true.  However, at 
the same time one can also draw attention 
to numerous scientific concepts that have 
been accepted as false or are the subject of 
scepticism and differences in opinion, but 
whose definitions have not changed to suit 
(cold fusion, spontaneous generation, phlo-
giston theory, luminiferous aether, phre-
nology, alchemy , transmutation of species, 
vitalism, telegony, Miasma disease theory, 
mental telepathy, graphology, acupuncture 
etc.).  However, it is important that this is-
sue is not turned into a straw man.  I am 
not advocating that, as a matter of principle, 
scientific definitions should of necessity con-
form to natural language and be constrained 
 
* It can be noted here 
that one could argue that 
“hypnotic suggestibility” is 
equivalent to responsiveness 
to primary or imaginative 
suggestibility, because one 
must be in a hypnotic state 
to experience these kinds of 
suggestions. However, apart 
from begging the question, 
this is simply another way 
saying that what essentially 
distinguishes hypnotic and 
non-hypnotic suggestibility 
is the presence of an altered 
state of consciousness; i.e. 
hypnosis is defined as an al-
tered state of consciousness.
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by their etymology.  Indeed, as I note in my 
response to Polito, Barnier and McConkey, 
my definition actually deviates somewhat 
from the strict etymological roots of hypno-
sis and related terms.  Rather, my arguments 
are that, 1) definition and explanation are not 
the same thing; i.e. to make sense, definitions 
do not need to conform to scientific opinion 
or accommodate a range of opinions; 2) in 
practice, semantic and conceptual problems 
will invariably result if one ignores etymol-
ogy and tries to ‘neutralise’ definitions in an 
attempt to accommodate different theoreti-
cal and explanatory viewpoints; 3) modern 
attempts to define hypnosis are very much 
prone to this kind of difficulty; and hence 4) 
there may be merit in attempting to formu-
late a definition of hypnosis that conforms 
more closely with its etymological roots.
Kirsch goes on to question the utility 
of hypnotic suggestibility scales as indirect 
proxy measures of hypnotizability.  I tend to 
agree with him on this point.  The main value 
of proxy measures generally is that they can 
be used when more direct measures are not 
available or are more difficult to administer. 
However, given that depth report scales are 
so easy to administer it is difficult to see how 
this argument would favour the use of imag-
inative suggestibility scales in most hypnosis 
contexts.  It could be argued perhaps that, in 
practice, suggestibility measures can provide 
the researcher with useful and important ad-
ditional information about how participants 
will respond to other suggestions; but even 
then, depth reports after induction appear to 
be as good predictors of responses to imagi-
native suggestions as imagination sugges-
tions are of themselves (Wagstaff et al., 2008). 
Also, in practical terms, because of the time 
involved in administering the standardized 
suggestion based scales, depth scales may have 
a further advantage in terms of efficiency.  So, 
in the end, perhaps the best argument I can 
come up with for advocating imaginative sug-
gestibility measures as proxy measures is sim-
ply that they have been used extensively in the 
past studies, so, retrospectively, they are all we 
have to go on when interpreting these studies. 
Also, if Terhune’s commentary is anything to 
go by, many people will continue to show a 
preference for using them.  
Connors
Connors (this issue) asserts that, “the dis-
tinction that Wagstaff draws between hyp-
notic suggestibility (responsiveness to sug-
gestions whilst in the hypnotic state) and 
hypnotic susceptibility (the ability to enter 
a hypnotic state) can be expressed without 
invoking the construct of state: that is, as 
responsiveness to suggestions and self-per-
ceived engagement in the hypnotic experi-
ence respectively” (pp. 126–127). I have been 
over what I perceive to be the problems with 
these types of definition a number of times, 
both in my original paper and my responses 
to other commentators, so I will not detail 
them again here. Suffice it to say, if hypnotic 
suggestibility is simply responding to sug-
gestions, and, therefore, by definition, hyp-
notic susceptibility is ‘self-engagement in ex-
perience of suggestions’, there is nothing to 
distinguish hypnotic suggestions from any 
other kinds of suggestions, hypnotic experi-
ences from any other kinds of suggested ex-
periences or ‘hypnotic induction procedures’ 
from any other kind of procedure that could 
be used to motivate people to engage in re-
sponding to suggestions.  In effect, terms 
such as ‘hypnosis’, ‘hypnotic susceptibility’ 
become redundant, equivalent to ‘sugges-
tion’ and ‘suggestibility’, and concepts such 
as hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestibility 
end up as meaningless tautologies equiva-
lent to, ‘suggestive and non-suggestive sug-
gestibility’. (For the possible implications of 
narrowing down hypnosis more specifically 
to responses to ‘imaginative suggestions’, see 
my previous response to Kirsch.)
Connors goes on to argue that the con-
cept of an altered state is problematic in 
various respects; for example, it is not clear 
whether it is to be used simply as a descrip-
tive concept or whether it is supposed to 
have a causal role in the production of hyp-
notic phenomena. I explicitly make refer-
ence to this issue in my paper and have de-
liberately worded my definition of hypnosis 
as an altered state so that it is neutral on the 
causality issue.  Nevertheless, as I have noted 
previously, as a long time advocate of the 
non-state socio-cognitive view, I very much 
share Connors’ reservations about the utility 
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of the altered state concept as an explanatory 
construct in relation to hypnosis. Indeed, 
this why my personal preference is for the 
hypnosis as a suggestion idea (see also, 
Wagstaff, 1998, 2004). But, having said this, 
I would still maintain that, notwithstanding 
disagreements about the exact characteris-
tics of the altered state concept, a definition 
of hypnosis that includes this idea makes far 
more sense than one that equates hypnosis 
with suggestion. Moreover, to meaningfully 
define hypnosis in terms of an ‘alleged’ al-
tered state of consciousness, neither Connors 
nor I have to commit to the idea that such 
a state actually exists, or that it influences 
behaviour, any more than we have to believe 
in the reality of spirits of the dead to define 
what is meant by ‘séance’.
Continuing, Connors states that 
“both definitions — at least as quoted by 
Wagstaff — define an altered state entirely in 
terms of the subject’s own self-report, which 
may overlook other aspects of hypnosis, such 
as the interpersonal interaction involved 
and the behavioural responses that it can 
produce” (p. 127). In response, I would point 
out that neither element of my definition 
defines hypnosis in terms of verbal report, 
entirely or even in part. In fact, in defining 
the essence of hypnosis, I make no reference 
at all to verbal report. The only reference 
to verbal report comes later with the argu-
ment that, in the absence of a set of discrete 
physiological or behavioural markers, at the 
moment, perhaps depth reports may be the 
best way we have of measuring hypnotizabil-
ity.  Moreover, neither changes in behaviour 
nor social interaction have been ‘overlooked’. 
The fact that hypnosis may elicit changes in 
behaviour is explicitly acknowledged in the 
definition. And ‘social interaction’ is not 
mentioned as a defining feature of hypnosis 
because  it is generally accepted that hypno-
sis often occurs in the absence of social inter-
action (as in self-hypnosis). 
Connors further suggests that the con-
cept of increased suggestion is not critical 
to hypnosis. I do not see the problem here. 
I make exactly the same point in my article 
(twice, with supporting references); indeed, 
I point out that, in some circumstances, a 
hypnotized person may show a significant 
decrease in suggestibility. Hence, although 
some have equated hypnosis with hyper-
suggestibility, in my definition, I state only 
that hypnosis is a condition “normally as-
sociated with increased suggestibility etc.”, 
and I add a supporting comment explicitly 
acknowledging this issue. 
In Connors view, post-hypnotic sugges-
tion also poses a problem for the hypnosis as 
a suggestion position. However, again I fail 
to see the difficulty. From the hypnosis as a 
suggestion position, a post-hypnotic sugges-
tion is simply a suggestion given to someone 
in a context defined as hypnosis to respond 
in a particular way when they are no longer 
in that context. As a result, particularly for 
those who believe they have been hypno-
tized, the use of post-hypnotic suggestions 
within the hypnosis context may raise ex-
pectancies and motivation to respond to 
cues delivered outside the context of hypno-
sis; there is no need to postulate that partici-
pants need a second suggestion to ‘re-enter a 
hypnotic state’ to respond to such cues. 
Connors ends his commentary by citing 
Kihlstrom’s definition as a possible alterna-
tive. Unfortunately, however, if we apply 
Kihlstrom’s definition in unmodified form, 
we seem to end up more or less back where 
we started with the APA and BPS defini-
tions: i.e. “hypnosis is a process in which 
one person, designated the hypnotist, offers 
suggestions to another person etc.”  Apart 
from the fact that it implies that hypnosis 
cannot exist in the absence of a social in-
teraction (i.e. self-administered suggestions 
and resulting experiences do not qualify as 
hypnosis), there is nothing in the defini-
tion that explicitly tells us what character-
istics apply to the designation ‘hypnotist’ 
(as distinct from say, a therapist or experi-
menter), what exactly constitutes a hypnotic 
suggestion as distinct from any other kind 
of suggestion, and what would constitute a 
hypnotic induction procedure. Interestingly, 
however, it may be possible to make some 
inferences in these respects. For example, 
if, as the definition states, ‘classic’ hypnotic 
suggestions are suggestions that are experi-
enced in an especially compelling way and 
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reflect ‘altered states of consciousness’, then 
presumably, one could infer that what es-
sentially distinguishes hypnotic and non-
hypnotic suggestion is the presence or oth-
erwise of ‘altered states of consciousness’. If 
so, then presumably a hypnotic induction 
is a procedure designed to induce these al-
tered states of consciousness, and a hypnotist 
is someone whose specific role is to induce 
such altered states. Moreover, a hypnotizable 
or hypnotized person is not simply someone 
who ‘experiences suggestions’, it is someone 
who experiences ‘altered states of conscious-
ness’ and shows unusually high levels of sug-
gestibility (displaying delusions, compulsion 
etc.). I would argue that this is beginning to 
look very familiar.
O’Neil
O’Neil (this issue) begins his commentary 
by questioning the need for what he terms 
a ‘final definition’ of hypnosis, and argues 
that there are semantic and empirical haz-
ards to a ‘final’ definition”. As an example 
of the former, he then refers to what he per-
ceives to be a problem of self-reference in the 
Oxford Dictionary’s definition of the term 
‘definition’ (which I cite in my paper). As far 
as I can see, this is a red herring. Whilst the 
Oxford Dictionary may involve an element 
of self-reference in its definition of ‘defini-
tion’, O’Neil does not actually specify any 
semantic problems with my particular defi-
nition of hypnosis.  In the next part of his 
commentary, he then states that the two 
main components of my definition are ‘lame’ 
and (to his apparent gratification) the defini-
tion has failed as a ‘final definition’.  These 
judgments appear to be based on the fact 
that the main components of my definition 
are non-committal with regard to whether 
an altered state we can meaningfully label 
as hypnosis actually exists.  Hence, he goes 
on to say, “We intend our words to designate 
real entities or phenomena, apart from how 
accurately they do so”, and, “I assume that 
‘hypnosis’ intends to designate a real state of 
consciousness which is different from the av-
erage expectable alert waking state” (p. 129). 
I fail to see the logic of this argument.  It does 
not follow that because some words may des-
ignate real entities or phenomena, hypnosis 
has to be one of them, or that we have to as-
sume or present it as real in order to define 
it.  As the various commentaries here show, 
modern expert opinion remains very divid-
ed about the actual existence of an entity we 
could meaningfully label a hypnotic altered 
state of consciousness; hence, in my view, 
although not absolutely necessary, I see no 
reason why this should not to some extent 
be reflected in a definition of hypnosis.  As I 
have already pointed out, there are a number 
of precedents for defining terms in this way. 
Although having ostensibly rejected the 
need for what he calls a ‘final definition’ of 
hypnosis, O’Neil then proceeds to provide 
an account that assumes the reality of the 
concept of a hypnotic state and describes 
how, in his view, it is operationalised in clin-
ical practice.  O’Neil’s examples raise some 
interesting issues about how the concept of 
a hypnotic state might be operationalised 
in clinical practice; however, I do not think 
they are particularly helpful with regard to 
whether or not we should accept the con-
cept of a hypnotic state as an actual entity. 
For instance, in support of his view, O’Neil 
argues that that, “just as there are a variety 
of EEGs for a variety of seizures, there may 
well be a variety of indicators for various al-
tered states of consciousness which would 
map out what a hypnotic state and a medi-
tative state have in common, and how they 
differ” (p. 130).  Clearly this statement speaks 
for itself in implicitly acknowledging that, 
as yet, despite extensive research, there are 
no definitive physiological markers, EEG 
or otherwise, that can be used as evidence 
for the existence of a hypnotic state (Lynn, 
Kirsch, Knox, & Lilienfeld, 2006; Mazzoni, 
Venneri, McGeown, & Kirsch, 2013; Oakley 
& Halligan, 2010).  
O’Neil then argues that “In clinical prac-
tice, the reality of a hypnotic state is gener-
ally judged by the whole practical context of 
the encounter: the quality of the working al-
liance, what is required to induce a hypnotic 
state (rapidity, pacing, repetition), what can 
be accomplished in the hypnotic state, what 
is required to re-alert from the hypnotic state 
(again, rapidity, repetition, pacing), and the 
quality of recall of the hypnotic state upon 
re-alerting” (p. 130).  However, whilst this 
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may be a reflection of what some clinicians 
do, to the best of my knowledge, it has never 
been empirically established that any of these 
indicators, either individually or in combi-
nation, qualifies as evidence for the reality 
of a ‘hypnotic altered state’.  For example, as 
I note in my paper, a variety of researchers 
have found that reports of the experience of 
hypnosis from hypnotizable individuals tend 
to be indistinguishable from those given by 
participants who have undergone relaxation 
training, or instructions in the use of imag-
ery (Barber, 1969; Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 
1974; Kirsch, Mobayed, Council & Kenny, 
1992; Lynn, Myer & Mackillop, 2000).  Also, 
with regard to what can be accomplished 
during hypnosis, it is notable that expectan-
cy and motivation tend to be more reliable 
predictors of how participants will respond 
to suggestions following hypnotic induction 
than other variables such as absorption, fan-
tasy proneness or dissociation (Braffman & 
Kirsch, 1999; Dienes et al., 2009; Kirsch & 
Braffman, 1999; Spanos, Arango & de Groot, 
1993).  Moreover, a variety of research also 
indicates that recall following hypnosis is 
strongly influenced, if not entirely deter-
mined by, ordinary social psychological 
and cognitive variables (Coe, 1999; Silva & 
Kirsch, 1987; Spanos, 1986; Wagstaff, 2004). 
Hence, in standard sociocognitive terms, 
one could just as well argue that what cli-
nicians are picking up when assessing the 
variables described by O’Neil is the degree 
to which clients are willing and able to think 
and imagine along with, and respond to the 
themes and suggestions given to them, in-
cluding the suggestion for hypnosis and feel-
ings of relaxation etc.; i.e. there is no need to 
postulate the existence and intervention of 
a ‘hypnotic altered state’ to explain what is 
happening. 
A similar analysis could be applied to 
O’Neil’s idea that there is a possible distinc-
tion to be made between what he terms ‘easy 
shallow’ hypnotizability and ‘arduous deep’ 
hypnotizability.  Thus he says, “A patient may 
require a long and onerous induction to en-
ter a hypnotic state, but then appear to be in 
very deep hypnotic trance, not only because 
of what is accomplished in that state, but also 
in the long an onerous re-alerting required 
to bring the patient back to the here and 
now” (p. 130).  Again this statement begs the 
question of whether there is a meaningful 
entity we can call a ‘hypnotic state’; however, 
if we substitute ‘hypnotic state’ with some-
thing more empirically verifiable, like ‘re-
ported depth’, and/or ‘increased response to 
suggestion’, then this could be construed as 
paralleling Cardeña’s finding that, for some 
participants, a long induction may be more 
effective in enhancing hypnotic respond-
ing than a very short one.  And, as such, it 
could be explained in the same way; i.e. for 
some individuals, a lengthy induction might 
be more likely to a) fit in better with their 
expectations about what a ‘hypnotic induc-
tion’ should involve, and b) give greater op-
portunity to generate non-specific experi-
ential changes that can be used to reinforce 
the attribution that ‘hypnosis’ is occurring. 
Moreover, having experienced a lengthy in-
duction, it might not be surprising if par-
ticipants were to anticipate a proportionately 
lengthy ‘re-alerting’ time and to act accord-
ing to their expectations.  In other words, 
once again, one can come up with an inter-
pretation that does not require the postula-
tion of a hypnotic altered state.  
O’Neil further proposes that a variety of 
other clinical diagnoses, such as Dissociative 
Identity Disorder, PTSD, Somatoform 
Disorder, and other Dissociative Disorders 
have what he calls significant ‘autohypnotic 
components’.  However, I would argue that 
the term ‘autohypnotic’ here is again ques-
tion begging.  For example, relationships be-
tween measures of dissociative experiences 
and standard measures of hypnotizability 
are known to be inconsistent and subject 
to contextual influences (see, for example, 
Bryant, Guthrie & Moulds, 2001; Dienes et 
al., 2009; Kirsch & Council, 1992; Nadon, 
Hoyt, Register & Kihlstrom, 1991; Spanos, 
Arango & DeGroot, 1993).  Comparisons be-
tween such conditions and hypnosis are also 
subject to methodological problems.  For 
example, in his seminal paper on Multiple 
Personality Disorder, Spanos (1994) presents 
a variety of evidence for the view that MPD 
is fundamentally socially constructed; that 
is, “it is context bounded, goal-directed, so-
cial behaviour geared to the expectations of 
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significant others” (p. 143).  In his view, the 
reason why patients diagnosed with MPD 
sometimes also score high on measures of 
hypnotizability is not because they have fall-
en into some kind of common ‘altered state’, 
but because, when MPD and hypnotizability 
are assessed, they are construed by patients 
as having similar role requirements to report 
and enact ‘as if ’ experiences.  Similar issues 
are raised in Lilienfeld et al.’s (1999) review of 
Dissociative Identity Disorder, and Bryant et 
al.’s (2001) discussion of the relationship be-
tween acute dissociative reactions to trauma 
and hypnotizability in clinical patients. 
Importantly, O’Neil then goes on to say, 
“I am struck by the ubiquity of ‘suggestion’ 
throughout the paper, as if hypnosis can’t be 
addressed except in the context of sugges-
tion, and as if the discussion were limited to 
‘normal’ subjects.  I wondered if the author’s 
concerns reflect the research world of hyp-
nosis quite distinct from the clinical world of 
hypnosis” (pp. 130–131).  With regard to the 
latter point, I would say that this is far from 
the case.  It has been my personal experience 
that for most practitioners who use hypno-
sis as an adjunct to therapy, suggestions are 
an integral feature of hypnosis procedures 
(hence the emphasis on suggestion in the 
APA and BPS definitions).  Moreover, the 
well known adage cited by O’Neil that “all 
hypnosis is self-hypnosis”, of course, fits very 
well with the sociocognitive view that hyp-
notic participants do not spontaneously or 
passively fall into a ‘hypnotic state’, but rath-
er they are active, cognizing agents, thinking 
and imagining along with the suggestions 
given to them (Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 
1974; Spanos, 1986).  
However, O’Neil proceeds in his attempt 
to distance hypnosis from suggestion by ar-
guing that, “Once in the hypnotic state, sug-
gestion is generally a decreasing part of the 
therapeutic work” (p. 131).  For the reasons I 
have just stated, I would consider this to be 
a somewhat idiosyncratic view of the use of 
hypnosis and suggestion in clinical hypnosis 
practice (for examples of the extensive use of 
hypnotic suggestions in clinical work, see, 
for example, Lynn, Rhue & Kirsch, 2010). 
Nevertheless, even if O’Neil’s observation 
here were accurate, there would still be no 
necessary contradiction between the fact 
that hypnotherapy may involve techniques 
or ‘therapeutic work’ other than sugges-
tion, and the idea that hypnosis per se is a 
product of suggestion, or that the practice 
of hypnosis (hypnotism) typically involves 
the use of suggestion.  This is because the 
general consensus amongst members of the 
scientific and medical community appears to 
be that hypnosis per se is not a therapy and is 
not equivalent to hypnotherapy; rather hyp-
notherapy involves the addition of hypnosis 
to the therapeutic techniques that practitio-
ners usually employ within the scope of their 
professional work (see, for example, the BPS 
report on the Nature of Hypnosis, 2001; Lynn, 
Rhue & Kirsch, 2010).  So, for example, ac-
cording to the hypnosis as a suggestion view, 
if the patient has been given and has ac-
cepted the suggestion for hypnosis, then for 
so long as the suggestion is accepted by the 
patient, it still remains at what O’Neil terms 
the ‘core of hypnosis’ regardless of what else 
the therapist might end up doing in his or 
her hypnotherapeutic regime. 
I would also take issue with O’Neil’s 
claim that, because patients may respond se-
lectively to suggestions (i.e. accepting some 
but resisting others), this negates a relation-
ship between hypnosis and suggestion.  He 
says, “If they [patients] were globally ‘sug-
gestible’ in the conventional sense, then they 
could be easily suggested back to mental 
health” (p. 131).  Perhaps so, but there has 
long been a consensus amongst hypnosis re-
searchers that hypnotic suggestibility is not 
an indicator of some trait of ‘global suggest-
ibility’.  Indeed, it is doubtful whether a trait 
of ‘global suggestibility’ even exists (Evans, 
1967; Stukat, 1958).  Hence, hypnotic sug-
gestibility is not the same as, for example, 
gullibility or persuasibility (Hilgard, 1973; 
Moore, 1964).  Rather, most high hypnotiz-
ables are best construed as active deliberat-
ing agents who remain in control of their ac-
tions and can selectively resist responding to 
suggestions as they see fit.  Thus, as Lynn et 
al. (2010) remark, “subjects retain the ability 
to control their behaviour during hypnosis, 
to refuse to respond to suggestions, and even 
to oppose suggestions” (p. 7).  Consequently, 
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if, for reasons of pathology, otherwise sug-
gestible hypnotic participants may decide to 
resist certain suggestions, this does not in 
any sense contradict an association between 
hypnosis and suggestibility, or the idea that 
hypnosis is a product of suggestion.  
O’Neil finishes his commentary by ask-
ing whether “a subset of subjects have a no-
cebo effect to the suggestion — a specific inhi-
bition to entering an altered state when told 
that this is the intent” (p. 131).  It is actually 
quite well established that if participants are 
tested with and without hypnotic induction, 
a number show a decrease in suggestibility 
(see, for example, Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; 
Hilgard & Tart, 1966).  One difficulty, how-
ever, has been determining whether such ef-
fects are simply a consequence of statistical 
and methodological artifacts such as ran-
dom fluctuation and regression to the mean. 
However, beyond this, a variety of evidence 
indicates that such responses are most likely 
to reflect the systematic effects of negative 
attitudes and expectancies.  For example, 
some investigators have reported  a ‘negative 
subject effect’  (Jones & Spanos, 1982; Jones 
and Flynn, 1989); that is, some participants, 
particularly those who do not consider them-
selves to be hypnotizable, may actually reject 
or perform counter to the suggestions given 
to them in the context of hypnosis such that 
they perform worse than under non-hypnotic 
conditions.  Jones and Spanos (1982) suggest 
that these results fit with others showing that 
participants who are relatively low on mea-
sures of hypnotizability are more likely to re-
port that they were purposely uncooperative 
when responding to hypnotic test sugges-
tions.  Moreover, common to such negative 
responding is the subject’s unwillingness to 
succumb to what he or she perceives to be 
manipulation by the experimenter.  The fact 
that some individuals may react negatively to 
situations and procedures defined as hypno-
sis is also found in some therapeutic situa-
tions.  In my experience, when this occurs, 
most therapists will try and educate patients 
more about the realities of hypnosis as it is 
now construed by most authorities (i.e. hyp-
notized individuals do not lose conscious-
ness or become subject to the arbitrary will of 
the hypnotist), as well as offering alternative 
procedures, including those similar to or the 
same as those that one would have employed 
in a hypnotherapeutic context, but devoid 
of any mention of ‘hypnosis’, or implication 
that it is involved (see, for example, Wagstaff, 
Daniel, Lynn, & Kirsch, 2009; Wagstaff & 
Davies, 1991).
Conclusion
My general conclusion is that, in terms of 
my intention to come up with a definition 
of hypnosis that would be acceptable to all, 
regardless of theoretical persuasion, I have 
clearly failed.  However, hopefully, I have en-
couraged more consideration of the matter. 
As I pointed out in my response to Laurence, 
theoretical debate is an essential and healthy 
feature of scientific enquiry; however, it is 
very difficult to proceed in a systematic and 
coherent manner if we cannot even agree 
on what it is we are actually supposed to be 
investigating.  Issues of definition are not 
trivial; if we cannot agree on them we will 
not have a common language to establish the 
goals of our inquiry and guide our research. 
From the responses to my paper, I would 
gauge that the main objections to my defini-
tion will come from those, such as Laurence 
and Terhune, who prefer some kind of simple 
operational, procedural approach.  However, 
as I have repeatedly tried to emphasize here, 
I believe this kind of approach will fail un-
less there is some kind of further evaluation 
of what supposedly differentiates a ‘hypnotic 
suggestion’ from a ‘non-hypnotic sugges-
tion’, and a ‘hypnotic induction procedure’ 
from any other kind of procedure.  In other 
words, to define what an ‘X’ suggestion or in-
duction procedure is, we need a definition of 
‘X’.  Of course we could say that what makes 
a procedure, ‘hypnotic’, is the literal pres-
ence of the word ‘hypnosis’ in an induction 
protocol.  Indeed, this view is mentioned in 
the 2003 APA definition and description. 
But if we adopt this position, we might want 
to question whether it really makes sense to 
exclude other procedures and situations in 
which the word ‘hypnosis’ is not explicitly 
used, but participants self-attribute the de-
scriptor ‘hypnosis’ to the situation or pro-
cedure.  Moreover, and perhaps most im-
portant, if adding the word ‘hypnosis’ is so 
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critical in defining a context as ‘hypnotic’, it 
might be worth reflecting on what concept 
is implied or conveyed by the word or label 
‘hypnosis’ that makes it so important and ac-
counts for its effectiveness (see, for example, 
Kirsch, Montgomery & Sapirstein, 1995).  I 
would suggest it is something that is the 
same or very similar to the idea that is the 
central feature of my definition.
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